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Abstract
Aggregate location statistics are used in a number of mobility
analytics to express how many people are in a certain location
at a given time (but not who). However, prior work has shown
that an adversary with some prior knowledge of a victim’s mo-
bility patterns can mount membership inference attacks to de-
termine whether or not that user contributed to the aggregates.
In this paper, we set to understand why such inferences are suc-
cessful and what can be done to mitigate them. We conduct an
in-depth feature analysis, finding that the volume of data con-
tributed and the regularity and particularity of mobility patterns
play a crucial role in the attack. We then use these insights to
adapt defenses proposed in the location privacy literature to
the aggregate setting, and evaluate their privacy-utility trade-
offs for common mobility analytics. We show that, while there
is no silver bullet that enables arbitrary analysis, there are de-
fenses that provide reasonable utility for particular tasks while
reducing the extent of the inference.
1 Introduction
The increasing availability of location data enables a grow-
ing number of mobility applications, ranging from forecast-
ing events [18] to monitoring depressive states [7], etc. Some
of these tasks often rely on aggregates: rather than single
users’ trajectories, these express the number of people tran-
siting in some geographic areas, or points of interest. For
instance, Waze builds traffic models using average driving
speeds [51], while Uber provides aggregate data for urban
planning purposes [48]. Also, Telefonica monetizes footfall
statistics through advertising and business analytics [45].
Evidently, mobility patterns expose sensitive attributes, e.g.,
lifestyles, religious inclinations, etc. as well as users’ home
and work place, which can be used to de-anonymize them [13].
These concerns do not effectively lessen when data is aggre-
gated; in fact, mobility profiles [36] or trajectories [52] can
still be inferred. In [37], Pyrgelis et al. show that, given an
aggregate time-series, an adversary can launch a membership
inference attack (MIA), inferring whether or not a target user
contributed to those aggregates. They also evaluate the effec-
tiveness of differentially private mechanisms to thwart the at-
tack, showing that they successfully mitigate inference but at
the cost of a dramatic reduction in utility.
∗Work done in part while the author was at UCL.
However, previous research has not provided meaningful
explanations as to what makes membership inference possi-
ble, e.g., what spatio-temporal factors contribute to the attack’s
success and in what contexts, nor which users are most vulner-
able and why. This lack of understanding also hampers the
design of defenses geared to provide acceptable privacy-utility
trade-offs. In this paper, we aim to address this gap by (1) car-
rying out an in-depth feature analysis to gain an understanding
of the reasons behind the attack’s success, and (2) using the in-
sights provided by the analysis to inform the design of defense
strategies and evaluate their privacy-vs-utility trade-off. For
both tasks, we use two real-world mobility datasets capturing
different mobility patterns, namely, the Transport For London
(TFL) and the San Francisco Cabs (SFC) datasets.
Understanding MIAs’ success. We follow a dimensionality
reduction approach to shed light on the spatio-temporal factors
that are important for the inference. We use Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) [22] on the aggregate location data
and examine the correlation coefficients in the components.
We discover that PCA not only helps with the analysis but,
as spatio-temporal correlations prevail in the aggregates, also
significantly boosts MIA’s performance. We also study the im-
portance of features (e.g., number of events, number of unique
locations visited etc.) in a classifier trained on users’ mobil-
ity characteristics and identify the factors that help the infer-
ence. Among other things, we find that the amount of data con-
tributed to the aggregation plays an important role, that move-
ments in less popular places/times can reveal a user’s presence
in the aggregates, and that the attack’s success is linked to the
uniqueness and regularity of mobility.
Defenses. We then evaluate the effectiveness of location pri-
vacy defense strategies, configured using insights from the fea-
ture analysis, at mitigating the inferences. For each defense,
we measure the gain in privacy as well as various utility met-
rics relevant to mobility analytics performed on aggregate lo-
cations, such as forecasting, hotspot discovery, location label-
ing, and anomaly detection. Our analysis demonstrates that,
while there is no single approach that enables arbitrary tasks
with high levels of privacy, there are strategies that can effi-
ciently balance the privacy-utility trade-off for specific spatio-
temporal tasks. For instance, data generalization can be used
for forecasting and map inference, suppression techniques al-
low ranking hotspots, while sampling yields good results on
sparser datasets, especially for data analysis based on the dis-
tribution over the locations. Furthermore, perturbation de-
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fenses that guarantee differential privacy enable hotspot dis-
covery, while other tasks, e.g., anomaly detection, can be per-
formed only when less noise is injected.
Contributions. In summary, we make several contributions:
1. We present a novel approach for MIA on aggregate loca-
tion time-series using PCA, which substantially improves
the performance of the attack while removing the need for
costly feature extraction.
2. Using two datasets representative of different users’ mo-
bility patterns, we gain a deep understanding of the mobil-
ity characteristics that make users vulnerable to the attack,
and identify the spatio-temporal features determining the
success of MIAs vis-a`-vis different priors.
3. We study the effectiveness of location privacy defenses
against MIA showing that for some settings they can pro-
vide protection while retaining utility for particular ana-
lytics tasks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Datasets
We perform experiments on two mobility datasets which
have often been used in location privacy research [42, 36, 37].
Together, they capture very different mobility patterns, gener-
ated from public transport commuters and taxis, respectively.
Transport For London (TFL). This dataset includes 60M
trips made by 4M passengers on the TFL transportation net-
work, between Monday, March 1st and Sunday, March 28th,
2010, using their “Oyster” travel cards. For each trip, we have
the oyster id (hashed with salt), start time, tap-in station id, end
time, and tap-out station id. Trips are made over 582 tube and
overground stations, or Regions of Interests (ROIs). We sample
the dataset and retain the data of the 10K oyster ids with the
largest amount of trips. We set the time granularity to 1 hour
and, for each oyster id, we generate a binary matrix whose
rows indicate ROIs and columns indicate timeslots. Each ele-
ment is 1 if the user tapped-in or out at a certain station, at a
certain time, and 0 otherwise. When a passenger does not tap
in or out of any station within a given timeslot, we assign it to
a special ROI, denoted as null. Overall, the sampled dataset
contains a total of 7.3M events, with the 10K oysters reporting
an average of 728±16 total tap-in/tap-out events, over 20±9
unique ROIs, and it is relatively sparse as the oysters are in the
transportation system, on average, for 115±21 out of the 672
hourly slots (28 days).
San Francisco Cabs (SFC). The SFC dataset contains mo-
bility trajectories of taxis in the San Francisco area between
May 17 and June 10, 2008 [34]. Each record includes a cab
identifier, latitude, longitude, and a timestamp. Overall, we
have 11M GPS coordinates generated by 536 taxis. We retain
3 weeks of data (Monday, May 19 to Sunday, June 8), keep-
ing only traces within an area of 30.3mi2 to cover downtown
San Francisco. We split this area in a uniform grid of 10×10,
with cells (ROIs) of 0.3mi2 each, and we set the time gran-
ularity to 1 hour. Again, for each cab we generate a binary
matrix (with rows representing ROIs and columns timeslots),
Symbol Description
Adv, Ch Adversary, Challenger
P Adversarial Prior Knowledge
U Set of Mobile Users
S Set of Locations (ROIs)
T Time Period Considered
TO , TI Observation and Inference Periods
m Aggregation Group Size
α Percentage of Users Whose Locations are Known
(Subset of Locations Prior)
β Number of Groups Whose Aggregates are Known
During TO (Participation in Past Groups Priors)
Table 1: Membership Inference Attack Notation.
indicating whether or not a cab transited through a location,
at a certain time, and we assign a cab not generating any event
within a timeslot to the null ROI. Overall, the final dataset con-
tains 2M events generated by 534 cabs, each reporting on av-
erage 3,827±1,069 events over 78±6 unique ROIs; thus, this
dataset is much less sparse than TFL, as taxis report ROIs for
340±94 out of the 504 time slots (21 days).
Aggregates. For both datasets, we compute the aggregate lo-
cation time-series over a group of users (i.e., passengers or
cabs) by adding their binary matrices. The resulting aggregate
location time-series indicates the number of users that transit
through the TFL and SFC ROIs, over time.
2.2 MIA on Aggregate Location Time-Series
Pyrgelis et al. [37] model membership inference attacks
(MIAs) on aggregate locations as a distinguishability game be-
tween an adversary (Adv) and a challenger (Ch): Adv needs to
distinguish location aggregates, provided by Ch, that include
the data of a target user from those that do not. The game has
several parameters, including the universe of users U , the size
of the aggregation groups m, and the inference period TI dur-
ing which Adv is being challenged. To mount the attack, Adv
uses a classifier trained on data over an observation period TO
available as part of her “prior knowledge”.
Priors. We consider different types of prior knowledge [37]:
1. Subset of Locations: Adv knows the actual locations for
a subset of users, including her target. The size of the
subset is controlled by a parameter α.
2. Participation in Past Groups: Adv knows her target’s par-
ticipation in aggregates observed during TO , with a pa-
rameter β indicating the number of groups whose aggre-
gates are known. More precisely, we have:
(2a) Same Groups As Released: Ch challenges Adv
with aggregates computed on the same groups as her
prior knowledge;
(2b) Different Groups Than Released: Adv is chal-
lenged on dynamic groups, which should make the
inference harder.
To ease presentation, notation is summarized in Table 1.
Privacy Loss. We measure the classifier’s Area Under the
Curve (AUC) score, capturing its performance in the distin-
guishing task for various classification thresholds, and com-
pute the privacy loss as the adversarial improvement over a
random guess baseline (i.e., AUC score of 0.5).
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Figure 1: MIA’s performance with Subset of Locations Prior: Features vs. PCA.
3 Understanding Membership Inference on
Aggregate Location Time-Series
In this section, we study what makes the presence of a user’s
location data points in aggregates inferable, and how this varies
based on the adversary’s prior knowledge.
3.1 Experimental Setup
As done in [37], we split users into three mobility groups
(highly, somewhat, and barely mobile) and run MIA against
150 users, 50 from each group, sampled at random. To target
a user, we create balanced datasets containing aggregate loca-
tion time-series that include and exclude her location data to
train/test the classifier used as a distinguisher by the adversary.
PCA Optimization. The classifier in [37] uses as features sim-
ple statistics computed for each location time-series (mean,
median, maximum, minimum, variance, standard deviation,
and sum). In a first feature analysis we find that, in both TFL
and SFC datasets, the variance of the location counts over time
is the dominant feature. We then use Principal Components
Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of the problem
and extract valuable information.1 We feed the components
to a Logistic Regression (LR) classifier—we choose LR as it
yields the best performance. The use of PCA not only helps us
to understand the effects of mobility patterns on MIA, but also
boosts the attack’s performance while also removing the need
for costly feature extraction.
To illustrate this improvement, in Figure 1, we plot the CDF
of the classifier’s AUC scores, computed over the 150 target
users, for both the feature extraction approach [37] and the di-
mensionality reduction one when using the Subset of Loca-
tions prior. The increase on the mean AUC score amounts to
65% for TFL, and 46% for SFC. We observe the same trend,
though somewhat less prominently, for the other priors: with
Same Groups As Released, the improvement is 22% for TFL
and 16% for SFC; with Different Groups Than Released, it
increases by 26% and 17%, respectively.
Roadmap. First, we examine the correlation coefficients
within the PCA components, highlighting which spatial and
temporal points contribute to the inference. We then train a
1PCA converts observations of correlated variables to linearly uncorrelated ones (prin-
cipal components) via an orthogonal transformation. The first principal component ac-
counts for as much variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding one has the
largest variance possible while being orthogonal to the previous components [22].
machine learning classifier on the mobility characteristics of
the victims that are most and least prone to the attack, and in-
vestigate its features’ importance to identify factors making the
attack more powerful. Specifically, we compute the following
statistics of the users’ trajectories: total events (i.e., location-
time tuples), unique locations visited, active timeslots, mean
locations per timeslot, mean events and active timeslots during
week days and weekends, spatial and temporal entropy, and
unicity. The latter captures how unique is a user’s travel pat-
tern, as unicityu=∑t∈T 1t(u)/|T |, where 1t(u) indicates
whether the ordered sequence of locations visited by user u
at time t is unique or not.
We also test intuitive hypotheses about the success of MIAs
on aggregate locations. For instance, does the volume of data
a user contributes to the aggregation affect her susceptibility
to the attack? Do users’ movements in less popular loca-
tions/times give membership away? Do very unique or very
regular mobility patterns increase the attack’s performance?
3.2 Subset of Locations Prior
We first study the case where Adv knows the actual locations
for a subset of users during the inference period.
Parameters. We set the percentage of users for which lo-
cations are known as α=0.11 and α=0.2 for TFL and SFC,
respectively, and consider the maximum user group size that
the adversary can attack: m=1,000 for TFL and m=100 for
SFC. In both cases, the first week is the observation and infer-
ence period (i.e., |TI |=168 hourly timeslots), and we create
datasets of 2K samples to train and test the classifier (with a
80%–20% train/test split).
3.2.1 TFL
Correlation Coefficients. In Figure 2a, we plot the aggregate
correlation coefficients for spatio-temporal points over the 2
most important principal components of each victim. Events in
various locations and times yield high correlation values (dark
red), i.e., diverse events contribute to membership inference.
We also find that different stations exhibit different levels of
correlation (possibly due to their location, e.g., central vs. res-
idential ones). As for time, we see differences between the
patterns of week days (ids 1–120) and of weekends (121–168),
with commuting hours having high correlation values. Inter-
estingly, for some ROIs, busy mid-day hours also yield high
correlation. The same happens with weekend events (right side
3
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Figure 2: Subset of Locations Prior, TFL (α=0.11, m=1, 000, |TI |=168). Aggregate spatio-temporal correlation over the top-2 com-
ponents per victim: (a) original heatmap; heatmap sorted (ascending-order) by location and timeslot popularity computed on (b) all
victims, (c) top 10%, and (d) bottom 10% of distinguishable victims.
Figure 3: Subset of Locations Prior, TFL (α=0.11, m=1, 000,
|TI |=168). Normalized timeslot frequency over TI .
of the heatmap): users’ presence in the aggregates might be re-
vealed if they travel at times when the transportation system is
less crowded.
Location/Timeslot Popularity. In Figure 2b, we sort the ag-
gregate correlation heatmap, both locations and time, accord-
ing to their frequency of appearance in the dataset. As ex-
pected, the more popular locations/timeslots yield the highest
correlation (upper-right corner), since most of the events are
generated in such locations/times. Nonetheless, data points in
popular locations but reported in less popular timeslots (upper-
left corner) are also important, suggesting that commuters can
be distinguished in the aggregates if they visit such locations
at non-busy times. Finally, a few points in less popular loca-
tions (and various times) are also important for the classifier,
i.e., movements in sparse locations/times can give away a com-
muter’s presence in the aggregates.
Susceptibility to MIA. We analyze the susceptibility to MIA
of the most and least distinguishable victims. For the top dis-
tinguishable victims (Figure 2c), we find very high coefficients
for relatively unpopular locations and times (middle part of the
heatmap), i.e., people visiting rare locations at rare times are
easy to attack. The most popular places and times (top right)
do yield high correlation, but they do not seem to be as crucial.
For the less distinguishable commuters (Figure 2d), popular
locations and times (top right part of the heatmap) are the most
important, and no other location seems to help the attack. We
believe that these are commuters that mostly travel at popular
stations/times and their data hides better along with those of
the crowd.
To verify these hypotheses we study the aggregate (normal-
ized) frequency of the timeslots in the inference week over the
two groups in Figure 3. The distinguishable commuters (blue
line) have higher frequency in mid and late evening hours of
week days (when the transportation system is less crowded)
Feature TFL SFC Feature TFL SFC
Total events 0.03 0.17 Events/weekday 0.01 0.07
Unique locations 0.39 0.01 Events/weekend 0.13 0.03
Active timeslots 0.06 0.23 Spatial entropy 0.01 0.03
Locations per timeslot 0.05 0.30 Temporal entropy 0.06 0.01
Active timeslots/weekday 0.01 0.01 Unicity 0.16 0.17
Active timeslots/weekend 0.11 0.01
Table 2: Subset of Locations Prior. Feature importance for a Ran-
dom Forest classifier separating top/bottom 10% distinguishable
victims: TFL (α=0.11, m=1, 000, |TI |=168) and SFC (α=0.2,
m=100, |TI |=168).
and during weekends; i.e., sporadic movements at these hours
facilitate membership inference. The less distinguishable oys-
ters (red line) mostly move during “commuting” hours and
their privacy is less harmed by the release of aggregates.
Next, we feed the mobility characteristics of the top and bot-
tom 10% distinguishable oysters to a Random Forest classifier
and examine which features can separate the two groups (see
Table 2). The most important feature is the number of unique
locations visited by a user: visiting more (unique) locations
increases the attack’s surface and thus its success. Second in
importance is the unicity, highlighting a link between MIA and
the uniqueness of mobility patterns: top victims have a unique
mobility pattern for 14±5 timeslots of TI , while the bottom
ones are unique only for 4±1.
3.2.2 SFC
Correlation Coefficients. In Figure 4a, we plot the aggre-
gate spatio-temporal correlation coefficients, computed over
the cabs’ top 5 components. As opposed to TFL, a large num-
ber of locations yield high coefficients, highlighting that GPS
movements offer a larger attack surface than tap-in/out events
at London stations. We see a similar effect for time, with high
correlations in mid-day hours, but also during weekends when
fewer drivers are working.
Location/Timeslot Popularity. Unsurprisingly, we find that
the most popular locations have high correlation values; see
Figure 4b. However, contrary to TFL where only a small sub-
set of stations and times are relevant (recall Figure 2b), in SFC
also mid-popular locations (i.e., ids 40-60), as well as certain
hours in less popular ROIs (ids 20-40), obtain significant cor-
relation. This suggests that popularity is not as important as in
TFL, there are many regions and times that help membership
inference.
Susceptibility to MIA. We compare the coefficients of the top
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Figure 4: Subset of Locations Prior, SFC (α=0.2, m=100, |TI |=168). Aggregate spatio-temporal correlation over the top-5 components
per victim: (a) original heatmap; ascending-order sorted heatmap by location and timeslot popularity computed on (b) all victims, (c)
top 10%, and (d) bottom 10% of distinguishable victims.
Figure 5: Subset of Locations Prior, SFC (α=0.2, m=100,
|TI |=168). Normalized timeslot frequency over TI .
and bottom distinguishable cabs (Figures 4c–4d). The former
yield slightly higher coefficients in the most popular locations
but during the least busy times. This confirms that movements
in less popular times enhance membership inference. For these
cabs, the counts of popular locations and timeslots also yield
high correlation values, i.e., they contribute a large portion of
points during the inference week. The heatmap of the least dis-
tinguishable cabs is much sparser: most cabs contribute little
data and the attack has little information to build on. Similarly
to TFL, the most popular locations and timeslots, where most
cabs contribute to anyway, yield the highest correlation, i.e.,
popular regions are not very revealing.
In terms of normalized frequency, Figure 5 shows that the
top distinguishable cabs (blue line) have higher frequencies in
late night hours of weekdays and during weekends, i.e., move-
ments in low activity hours facilitate attacks. Whereas, the
less distinguishable cabs (red line) contribute some data at the
beginning of the week, but less afterwards. This confirms that
the most distinguishable cabs are those which contribute larger
volume of spatio-temporal points, i.e., bigger data contribu-
tion enhances MIA performance.
As for TFL, we study which features are important to sep-
arate effectively the top and bottom 10% distinguishable cabs
(see Table 2). The top feature is the mean number of loca-
tions per timeslot, showing that unlike in TFL where most
commuters report similar volumes of data, in the SFC dataset
vehicles with more data points are overall more susceptible to
MIAs. We also observe that, similarly to TFL, MIA’s perfor-
mance is strongly linked to the uniqueness of cabs’ mobility
trajectories. The top distinguishable cabs exhibit larger unicity
(their patterns are unique for 124±6 out of the 168 timeslots)
than the bottom ones (unique pattern for 38±30 timeslots).
(a) TFL (b) SFC
Figure 6: Same Groups As Released Prior. Aggregate spatio-
temporal correlation over the top components per victim for (a)
TFL (β=500, m=9, 500, |TI |=168) and (b) SFC (β=800, m=500,
|TI |=168).
3.3 Participation In Past Groups Prior
Next, we analyse the case where Adv knows the target vic-
tim’s participation in aggregate locations released during an
observation period TO . We consider two settings for this prior:
(a) one where the Adv performs inference on the same groups
as in the observation period, and (b) another where the infer-
ence is made on different groups.
Parameters. We set the size of the groups to m=9,500 for TFL
and m=500 for SFC. We consider TO to be the first weeks of
each dataset, and use them to construct the prior knowledge the
adversary relies on to train her classifier. The attack is run on
the last week (|TI |=168). We configure the number of known
groups as β=500 and β=800, for TFL and SFC, creating large
enough training/testing datasets (of 2K (2.4K) samples for TFL
(SFC)).
3.3.1 Same Groups As Released
Correlation Coefficients. We start with the setting where
Adv performs MIA on the same groups as those on which
she trained her classifier. We plot the aggregate correlation
coefficients for the most important principal components of
the victims in TFL (top 1 component/victim) and SFC (top 5
components/victim) in Figure 6. For TFL, the most correlated
data points now occur during the morning commuting hours
of weekdays, highlighting that regularity in mobility patterns,
e.g., the daily commute to work, helps MIA. This explains the
MIA’s great success on TFL with this type of prior [37]. In-
terestingly, we also find that popular locations/times as well as
less popular locations on popular times (and vice versa) con-
tribute to the inference, showing that commuters exhibit differ-
ent regular patterns that are equally useful for the attack.
5
For SFC, movements in some weekdays’ slots yield high
correlation, i.e., there are some regular cabs that are more
susceptible to MIA than others. Looking at the location and
timeslot popularity, we find high correlations scattered in the
spatio-temporal space. Nonetheless, we observe that move-
ments during less popular timeslots obtain slightly higher cor-
relation values in the components, i.e., cabs regular at such
times are prone to MIA. Overall, the attack does not work very
well with this prior when victims do not exhibit the same mo-
bility patterns over the weeks, as most cabs in SFC.
As for mobility characteristics, we do not analyze them for
TFL since all commuters are harmed equally. For SFC, the
insights are similar to those for the Different Groups Than Re-
leased prior, discussed next.
3.3.2 Different Groups Than Released
Correlation Coefficients. We investigate the setting where
Adv performs MIA over different groups than those on which
she trained her classifier. Overall, the insights are similar as for
the Same Groups As Released prior for both datasets (thus, we
omit the corresponding heatmaps): regular mobility patterns
contribute to the success of MIA. Nevertheless, it is not clear
what locations or times are more important, i.e., various types
of regular patterns make MIA successful.
Susceptibility to MIA. We compare the mobility characteris-
tics of the top and bottom 10% distinguishable victims using
a Logistic Regression classifier. Table 3 reports the model’s
coefficients for each feature (negative and positive coefficients
indicate, resp., the more and less distinguishable victims). For
both datasets, the strongest feature for the top victims is the
uniqueness of mobility patterns: the more unique movements
are, the easier it is to infer membership on dynamic groups.
With TFL, we find that the top victims have unique pattern for
47±13 out of the 672 hourly timeslots, while the bottom ones
exhibit unicity for 32±7 timeslots. With SFC, top victims ex-
hibit unique mobility for 357±45 out of the 504 timeslots, and
the bottom ones are unique for 287±85 timeslots.
Features related to time patterns also play an important role
in separating the two groups for TFL; e.g., the top distinguish-
able users are mostly contributing events during days of the
week, the bottom ones in the weekends. The results also sug-
gest that top users are mostly regular weekday commuters in
less popular ROIs (and thus more unique), while bottom ones
travel to locations outside their “regular” pattern during week-
ends. This is confirmed by other features with high coeffi-
cients, e.g., the number of unique locations and spatial entropy.
For SFC, the amount of data contributed yields stronger fea-
tures for the more distinguishable cabs, i.e., ‘regular’ cabs re-
porting larger volumes of data are more identifiable. For the
least distinguishable cabs, the number of unique locations is
stronger. Overall, this confirms that when the adversary trains
on past groups, showing up in many locations, but without re-
peating patterns, can reduce her power.
3.4 Take Aways
Our analysis provides several interesting conclusions. First
of all, we show that the performance of MIA on aggregate lo-
Feature TFL SFC Feature TFL SFC
Total events 0.20 -0.36 Events/weekday -0.47 -0.38
Unique locations 0.78 1.29 Events/weekend 0.64 -0.17
Active timeslots -0.17 0.05 Spatial entropy 0.52 -0.18
Locations per timeslot 0.01 -0.33 Temporal entropy 0.17 -0.06
Active timeslots/weekday -0.48 0.28 Unicity -1.55 -0.68
Active timeslots/weekend 0.42 -0.46
Table 3: Different Groups Than Released Prior. Model coeffi-
cients of a Logistic Regression classifier separating top/bottom
10% distinguishable victims: TFL (β=500, m=9, 500, |TI |=168)
and SFC (β=800, m=500, |TI |=168).
cation time-series can be significantly boosted using dimen-
sionality reduction techniques such as PCA (up to 65% mean
AUC increase for TFL and 46% for SFC), as aggregate loca-
tion data retains strong spatio-temporal correlations from the
data provided by individual users. We also find the spatio-
temporal correlations within the principal components to be
aligned with the mobility patterns in the data. For instance,
commuting patterns emerge quite clearly in the components of
the TFL dataset, while dense GPS trajectories create a large
attack surface to be exploited in SFC. In both cases, there is
a variety of spatio-temporal points and trends that contribute
towards to the inference’s success. Thus, designing generic,
robust defenses is inevitably an extremely challenging task.
Also, our analysis of the mobility characteristics that best
split the most and least distinguishable victims sheds light on
which factors affect the success of the inference. We find that:
1) Users who contribute more data points to the aggregation
are more susceptible to MIA; 2) Movements in sparse loca-
tions/timeslots can give away one’s presence in the aggregates;
and 3) Unique and regular mobility patterns are more identifi-
able in the aggregates.
Finally, we identify factors that negatively affect the attack’s
performance; e.g., presence in popular locations and times
generally limits inferences, and so do irregular movements that
do not hold over time when prior knowledge is built using in-
formation from the past.
4 Defenses
In this section, we experimentally evaluate how existing strate-
gies commonly used to protect location privacy – configured
based on the insights from the analysis presented above – per-
form in the setting of aggregate location time-series.
4.1 Preliminaries
Experimental Setup. We focus on the cases where MIA
works best, to simulate a worst case scenario for the defenses.
For TFL, we consider the Same Groups As Released prior
knowledge, with β=500, groups of m=9,500 users, and TO
being the first 3 weeks of the dataset and TI the last one. For
SFC, we choose the Subset of Locations prior, with α=0.5,
m=250, and both TO and TI being the first week. We also
consider a strategic adversary that knows the mechanism em-
ployed by the defender and can use this to optimize her training
(i.e., the adversary trains on aggregates perturbed using that
defense strategy).
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Privacy Gain (PG) Metric. Following Pyrgelis et al. [37], we
measure the effectiveness of the defenses as the normalized
decrease in the adversarial performance:
PG =
{
AUCA−AUCA′
AUCA−0.5 if AUCA > AUCA′ ≥ 0.5
0 otherwise
(1)
where AUCA is the performance on raw aggregates, and
AUCA′ is the performance of the attack after a defense has
been applied. PG is a value between 0 and 1, capturing how
much the inference power drops towards the random guess
baseline (AUC score of 0.5) where users have perfect privacy.
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
Our feature analysis shows that, in general, it is not possi-
ble to identify a fundamental set of features that, if protected,
would deter MIAs for all users. As a result, there is no straight-
forward approach to distill a defense that directly tackles the
core of the problem. Therefore, we explore a range of defenses
commonly used in the location privacy literature, namely, gen-
eralization, hiding, and perturbation. In the rest of this section,
we discuss possible configurations for each strategy to operate
in the aggregate location setting. We also report boxplots of
the privacy gain (over the users that we attack) for the most in-
teresting defenses configurations in Figures 7a for TFL and 7b
for SFC.
4.2.1 Generalization
With generalization, one reduces the precision with which
spatio-temporal events are reported [14, 25], and thus their
uniqueness [9]. Bucketing techniques, i.e., reporting data in
ranges rather than releasing exact statistics, can also be used
to this end. This approach has been used to protect privacy
in domains such as website fingerprinting, by obfuscating the
length of network packets [6]; or social network privacy, by
providing inexact statistics to advertisers [49].
Spatial Generalization (SPG). We first experiment varying
the spatial granularity, while keeping the temporal resolution to
one hour. This technique has been used to decrease the unique-
ness of mobility traces [9], which our analysis showed to be
correlated with the success of MIA. For TFL, we group nearby
stations – with the group size being a parameter which we con-
figure in the set {5, 10, 20} – and compute their combined ag-
gregates. We find that, only when 20 stations are grouped to-
gether, there is a small increase in PG (0.30 on average), with
few outliers reaching higher protection.
For SFC, we use grids of different spatial resolution to di-
vide up the 30mi2 area of downtown San Francisco, ranging
from a baseline 10×10 grid resulting in ROIs of 0.3mi2, to one
single ROI of 30.3mi2 (with the intermediate grid sizes being
5×5 and 2×2). Only when we consider a single ROI (1×1
grid) the PG increases slightly (0.25 on average), nonetheless,
PG≤0.23 for 75% of the cabs. This means that the temporal
dimension of the location contains enough information for the
attack to succeed, when the adversary has the ‘Subset of Loca-
tions’ prior. In other words, such an attacker can perform MIA
on the SFC dataset even without any spatial information.
Temporal Generalization (TG). We then vary the length of
each timeslot from 1 hour (the baseline) to 1 week, keeping
the original spatial resolution. For TFL, MIA’s performance
only decreases significantly with 1-week granularity, increas-
ing PG to 0.31 on average with few outliers. That is, regular
commuting patterns remain distinguishable in the aggregates
even for relatively long periods of time. In SFC, the attack’s
performance starts degrading earlier (i.e., PG=0.15 for 1 day
resolution), and while PG reaches 0.35 with a 1-week timeslot,
it remains less than 0.27 for 25% of the cabs. This means that
just 1 time point may be sufficient for the attack to succeed.
Overall, even without the temporal dimension, the spatial do-
main still contains enough information to perform inference.
In theory, if one simultaneously generalized both time and
space, MIA would be successfully mitigated; e.g., for 1×1 grid
with 1-week temporal resolution, PG reaches 0.96 for SFC.
However, in such a setting, the aggregates are not useful at all
(see discussions in Section 5).
Data Generalization (DG). Finally, we experiment with re-
leasing ranges: for instance, rather than reporting that 124
users were in a given ROI during a 1-hour timeslot, the range
‘120–130’ is published.
Data Generalization with Fixed Ranges (DGFR). We fix the
interval size (denoted as x) w.r.t. the group size parameter m,
i.e., we vary the interval based on the minimum and maxi-
mum possible values of the overall aggregates (as indicated
by m). Then, we assign the location counts to the median of
a range interval. For TFL, we range x in the set {2, 5, 10, 50,
150, 9,500}. We observe a significant gain for x∈ {5, 10},
with 50% of the commuters obtaining gains 0.45≤PG≤0.6
and 0.7≤PG≤0.8, respectively. When x=9, 500, i.e., the max-
imum possible count a location could have, there is no variance
in the data and MIA becomes impossible, yielding PG=1. For
SFC (x ∈ {2, 5, 10, 50, 100, 250}), DGFR requires larger
intervals to have an effect on PG. For instance, when x=50
the PG highly varies (0.35≤PG≤0.8 for 50% of the cabs) and
grows slowly and more consistently as x increases (mean PG
0.68 when x=100) until reaching PG=1 for all users when
using the maximum possible interval (x=250).
Data Generalization with Adaptive ranges (DGAR). We also
evaluate an adaptive approach to select the range interval for
each location based on its minimum and maximum value over
time. By tailoring the range to the locations, we expect to ob-
tain better utility results (see Section 5). This approach is pa-
rameterized by x′ ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16}, which indicates the num-
ber of buckets released per location time-series. For TFL, pub-
lishing 1 or 2 buckets per location time-series results in a mean
privacy gain of 0.91 and 0.71, respectively. When increasing
x′, PG decreases: with x′=4 a few outliers are no longer pro-
tected from MIA. Similarly, for SFC, publishing 1 bucket per
location yields a PG between 0.55 and 0.85 for 50% of the
cabs, while with x′=2, the mean PG already drops to 0.25.
This means that, as soon as information about the evolution of
the location aggregates over time is revealed, cabs begin to be
exposed to the attack.
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Figure 7: Privacy Gain for Various Defenses & Parameters.
4.2.2 Hiding
Another common approach used in location privacy litera-
ture is to hide (i.e., exclude) some spatio-temporal data points,
by either suppressing or sampling them [19, 43]. Typically,
sensitive points are removed and the released locations are not
perturbed with any kind of noise.
Suppressing Small Counts (SSC). We first try suppressing
points with small counts, i.e., replacing the points of the ag-
gregate location time-series that do not exceed a certain thresh-
old k with zeros. This approach satisfies the notion of (k, 0)-
crowd-blending privacy, introduced by Gehrke et al. in [11].2
For TFL (k ∈ {2, 5, 10, 20, 40, 80}), suppressing counts
with values smaller than 10 does not yield any privacy pro-
tection. As k increases, we do observe some gain in privacy;
e.g., PG=0.38 for k=20, reaching 0.75 (resp., 0.93) when k is
set to 40 (resp., 80). The SFC dataset is much denser, thus, it
requires higher k to provide protection (we configure k ∈ {2,
5, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160}). Surprisingly, only when k=80 the
PG increases to 0.4 on average, remaining smaller than 0.2 for
25% of the cabs. For k=160, mean PG increases to 0.78 while
it is greater than 0.5 for most cabs.
Suppressing Less Popular Locations/Timeslots (SLP). In-
spired by the result of the feature analysis in Section 3, which
shows that some commuters/cabs are more “distinguishable”
in the aggregates because they contribute events in less pop-
ular locations or times, we also experiment suppressing those
2k-crowd-blending sanitization ensures that the data of each individual u in
a database blends with that of k − 1 other individuals, i.e., the output of a
sanitization mechanism is indistinguishable if u’s data is replaced by that of
any of the other individuals.
data points. We consider suppressing a percentage z ∈ {0.2,
0.4, 0.6, 0.8} of the least popular locations and timeslots.
However, despite the insight provided by our feature analy-
sis, this technique does not actually provide significant gains.
For instance, in TFL, suppressing 80% of the least popular
locations/timeslots still yields a PG between 0.2 and 0.3 for
50% of the oysters. Similarly, in SFC, only some outliers
are protected when we retain 20% of the most popular loca-
tions/timeslots (i.e., z=0.8). This fact reinforces the conclu-
sion that the counts of the busiest locations/times contain in-
formation that help MIA.
Sampling (SMP). In Section 3, we also showed that a factor
playing a part in the success of MIA is the amount of data users
contribute to the aggregation. Therefore, we consider sampling
as a means to reduce the amount of users’ data. We remove a
percentage w ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} of users’ data points at
random, and release the aggregate location time-series com-
puted on the sampled trajectories. For TFL, this defense of-
fers some privacy protection: the mean PG is 0.6 when w=0.4
(with only a few outliers not so well protected), and increases
up to 0.9 when removing 80% of the users’ points. Thus, sam-
pling might be a promising defense strategy against MIA on
sparse datasets. On the contrary, this approach does not work
nearly as well on the denser SFC dataset. Here, PG is negligi-
ble even when 60% of the events are randomly removed, and
is between 0.2 and 0.3 for 50% of the cabs when 20% of their
points are retained.
4.2.3 Perturbation
Next, we study the effect of perturbing the values of the ag-
gregate location time-series, with carefully crafted noise. The
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state-of-the-art method for releasing aggregate statistics free
from inferences is to satisfy differential privacy (DP) [10].
In this setting, Acs and Castelluccia [1] specify an algorithm
tuned to the density of Paris for releasing aggregates statistics
from a telecommunication service provider’s dataset, while
Quercia et al. [38] use randomized response to let an un-
trusted aggregator privately learn the number of people in ge-
ographic locations. However, previous work [37, 36, 46] has
shown that DP techniques ultimately yield poor utility on high-
dimensional settings. To mitigate this problem, the noise addi-
tion can be configured to achieve weaker privacy guarantees,
such as crowd-blending privacy [11], while retaining better
utility levels. For instance, To et al. [46] apply this notion to
release privacy-preserving location entropy statistics.
Perturbing Small Counts (PSC). We first add noise sampled
from the Laplace distribution with scale O(1/e′) only to small
counts, i.e., counts of the aggregate location time-series that
are smaller than a threshold k. This achieves (k, e′)-crowd-
blending privacy [11]. We range k as in Section 4.2.2 (SSC)
and configure e′ to 1.0 for TFL and to 0.1 for the SFC dataset,
since we expect that the denser SFC dataset requires larger
scale noise addition to obtain some privacy protection. For
TFL, this approach results in reasonable privacy gain. For in-
stance, with k=5 the mean PG is 0.55 (with some outliers hav-
ing less protection), while with k=40 the PG is higher than
0.6 for all commuters. On the contrary, for SFC, this mech-
anism does not offer much protection unless k=160, where
0.6≤PG≤0.7 for 50% of the cabs.
Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA). We then experiment
with FPA [39], a differentially private mechanism tailored to
time-series settings (see Appendix A for the algorithm’s de-
scription). We set e in the range {0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0}. As
expected, PG is higher for smaller values of e (i.e., stronger
DP privacy guarantees). For TFL, with e≤0.1 PG reaches 1.0,
while with e=1.0 it is above 0.85 for all the users. For larger
values of e, (i.e., 10.0), PG drops between 0.4 and 0.5 for 50%
of the commuters. Similarly, for SFC, the mean PG is very
high for e values up to 1.0 (e.g., PG≥0.75 for all the cabs
when e=1.0) but only a few outliers are well protected when
e=10.0.
4.2.4 Combining Hiding and Perturbation
Finally, we investigate whether combining defense strate-
gies can improve the privacy gain. In particular, we focus on
the combination of sampling with perturbation which has been
suggested in previous work [11, 26]. For instance, Gehrke
et al. [11] show that introducing a random sampling step be-
fore the application of a crowd-blending privacy mechanism
(e.g., PSC) achieves a stronger privacy notion, namely, zero-
knowledge privacy [12].3 Similarly, Li et al. [26] suggest that
a random sampling step can amplify the privacy offered by a
differentially private mechanism, thus, we also combine sam-
pling with FPA.
Sampling & Perturbing Small Counts (SPSC). For TFL, we
3A zero-knowledge private mechanism applied on a database does not release
any additional information beyond some aggregate information that is ac-
ceptable to publish.
set k to 5 and e′ to 1.0, while for SFC, we set k to 20 and e′ to
0.1. For both datasets, we range the sampling parameter w in
{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. We find that the introduction of a random
sampling step boosts the PG of the perturbation mechanism.
For TFL, when we retain 80% of the data (i.e., w=0.2), the
PG is higher than 0.68 for all the users and 0.85 on average.
This is a 4× and 2× increase compared to SMP or PSC alone.
Furthermore, with w=0.6 or 0.8, PG almost reaches 1. On
the SFC dataset, we observe once again that more data needs
to be removed to obtain some PG for the cabs. In particular,
sampling boosts the mean privacy gain to 0.21 when w=0.6, a
4× or 21× increase compared to SMP and PSC alone. When
we set w to 0.8, PG is between 0.45 and 0.6 for 50% of the
cabs.
Sampling & Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (SFPA). For
both datasets, we configure FPA’s privacy budget e to the least
conservative setting, i.e., e=10.0, while varying w, to observe
its amplifying effect on PG. For TFL, when we retain 80%
of the data (i.e., w=0.2) the mean PG is 0.68, which is ap-
prox. 2.5 times or 1.5 times higher than SMP or FPA, respec-
tively, alone. As we increase w, the PG is increasing further,
e.g., with w=0.8 PG≥0.8 for all commuters. For SFC, higher
sampling rates are required to obtain similar privacy levels.
When w=0.4, a few outliers are not protected from MIA while
when w=0.8, 0.7≤PG≤0.8 for 50% of the cabs.
4.3 Unsuitable Defenses
In theory, one could attempt to add dummy locations to ob-
fuscate users’ trajectories [30]. However, it is well-known
that generating plausible dummy locations is extremely hard,
as those can be easily filtered by the adversary by exploiting
statistical correlations with real locations, and thus ultimately
provide no protection [8].
Another possible approach would be to generate and use
synthetic traces [3, 28, 17, 15, 31], and compute the statis-
tics on them, rather than on the actual locations of the users.
However, when attempting to implement and evaluate these
methods, we found that the synthetic trajectories generated us-
ing techniques presented in [17, 15] do not preserve the time
dimension, while those proposed in [28, 31] only work for one
specific analytic task—namely, computing origin-destination
commute distances.
Bindschaedler and Shokri [3] support plausible deniability
with respect to whether a real trace (a “seed”) was part of the
training set used by a privacy-preserving generative model to
produce synthetic traces. Given a set of synthetic traces, an
adversary cannot learn which locations the seed contributors
have visited or whether a user with certain semantic habits is
in the seed dataset. This is a different goal than the one we
consider, i.e., given aggregate location statistics, preventing an
adversary from inferring whether a user contributed to them.
Moreover, when the goal is to release traces [3], one can afford
to aggressively sample points from the trajectories in order to
make the system scale. Whereas, we cannot do so since, in
the use cases considered in our paper, we need fine-grained
statistics. Not using aggressive sampling remarkably increases
the computational cost of the generation process and ultimately
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makes it impossible to properly evaluate [3]’s approach in our
setting.
4.4 Take Aways
Overall, our experiments show that, spatio-temporal gen-
eralization, a technique commonly used to protect privacy for
mobility trajectories [25, 14, 9], does not yield meaningful pro-
tection against MIA on aggregate location time-series, since
both dimensions contain information that is useful for the at-
tack. On the contrary, data generalization approaches like dis-
cretizing the counts of the time-series can actually provide ac-
ceptable privacy levels. However, the protection obtained for a
discretization level is data-dependent, thus, it is not possible to
have a universal mechanism to configure the mechanism other
than doing an ad-hoc privacy analysis.
We also find that hiding techniques (e.g., suppression or
sampling) yield higher privacy levels when the input signal
is sparse (as for TFL), but do not work as well on dense
datasets (SFC). Regardless, suppressing locations/timeslots
based on popularity does not improve privacy, indicating that
busy ROIs/times contribute significantly to the attack.
Finally, perturbation techniques configured to guarantee
differential privacy achieve, as expected, very high gains in
privacy. However, similar levels of protection can be reached
with less noise using techniques like crowd-blending saniti-
zation. Also, combining both sampling and perturbation can
significantly amplify the defenses’ privacy gain.
5 Privacy–Utility Trade-off
We now study the impact of the defense strategies on utility, for
different levels of privacy protection. Privacy is again quanti-
fied via the ability of mitigating MIA (i.e., the Privacy Gain),
while we measure utility vis-a`-vis analytics tasks that may
rely on aggregate location time-series: (1) forecasting traffic
volumes in Regions of Interest [21, 18], (2) mining interest-
ing locations or discovering hotspots [55, 23], (3) map infer-
ence [27], and (4) detecting mobility anomalies [35]. To repre-
sent each analytics setting, we consider utility metrics that cap-
ture the key characteristics of the aggregate data enabling that
application. In Figures 8–11, we plot the privacy gain vs. the
utility loss for each task (i.e., the decrease in utility compared
to performing the same task on raw aggregate location time-
series).4 Ideally, we would like to obtain data points on the
upper left corner of the plots, i.e., where the privacy gain is
high and the utility loss is low.
5.1 Forecasting Traffic: Aggregates Error
Aggregate location time-series are often used for forecast-
ing traffic in ROIs [21, 18]. We measure the utility loss by
quantifying the effect of a defense on the precision of the data
release, i.e., the error the defense introduces, as that would
inevitably effect the forecast as well. We use the Mean Rel-
ative Error (MRE) over the whole time-series or a percentage
thereof (e.g., the MRE over the 10% busiest ROIs). Given two
4In Appendix B, we report several tables indicating how the configuration of
each defense affects the utility metrics under consideration.
time-series Y and Y′, of length |T |, denoting the aggregates
before and after a defense has been applied, we calculate:
MRE(Y,Y′) = 1|T | ∑t∈T
|Y′t −Yt|
max(γ,Yt)
(2)
(γ is a sanity bound mitigating the effect of very small counts).
Figure 8 plots the results for this task. For TFL, defenses
like data generalization with adaptive ranges (DGAR), sam-
pling alone (SMP) or combined with FPA perturbation (SFPA),
and small count suppression (SSC), yield reasonable privacy–
utility trade-offs (Figure 8a). If one is interested in perform-
ing predictive analytics only on the busiest stations (e.g., MRE
10% – Figure 8b), defenses such as perturbing small counts
(PSC) or data generalization with fixed ranges (DGFR) yield
better trade-offs, with the former performing better than the
latter in terms of utility (but worse for privacy). In this set-
ting, if slightly higher utility loss can be tolerated, sampling
and perturbation of small counts (SPSC) as well as FPA can
provide better privacy (i.e., PG between 0.8 and 1.0).
For SFC, DGAR or SSC yield small MRE overall (Fig-
ure 8c) and could be used well for predictive analytics.
Nonetheless, to forecast traffic in the top 10% of SFC re-
gions (Figure 8d), FPA or PSC yield an efficient privacy–utility
trade-off balance (0.9 PG and 10−2 utility loss for the former
and 0.64 PG and 9 · 10−3 utility loss for the latter).
5.2 Hotspot Discovery: Prediction Accuracy &
Rank Correlation
Analysts are often interested in predicting location hotspots
over time [55]; this is particularly useful for journey planning
and/or resource allocation. For instance, authorities need to
learn which stations are the busiest in certain hours of a day
to allocate staff accordingly, or to suggest alternative routes to
commuters. Hotspot discovery is also crucial to identify the
optimal location and time to place advertisements, open new
shops, etc. [45, 23]. For this task, we measure utility as fol-
lows: we use the aggregates after applying a defense to predict
the busiest 10% ROIs at each timeslot of the inference week,
and calculate the F1 score of the predictions:
F1 = 2 · PPV · TPR
PPV + TPR
(3)
where PPV = TPTP+FP is the precision and TPR =
TP
TP+FN is
the recall of the predictions, with TP,FP and FN indicating the
true/false positives and false negatives, respectively.
Note that the F1 score quantifies how successful hotspot
prediction is in each timeslot, but does not capture if the or-
dering of the hotspots is preserved. This might be important
for resource planning, e.g., a taxi company assigning vehicles
to locations sorted by client demand. Thus, we also calculate
the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, a measure of corre-
spondence between two rankings, whereby values closer to 1
indicate strong agreement and those closer to −1 strong dis-
agreement. More precisely, given two rankings, X and X′, the
Kendall rank correlation τ(X,X′) is computed as:
τ(X,X′) = P−Q√
(P+Q+ T) · (P+Q+U) (4)
10
10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1 100 101 102
Utility Loss
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Ga
in
SPG
TG
DGFR
DGAR
SSC
SLP
SMP
PSC
FPA
SPSC
SFPA
(a) TFL - MRE
10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1 100 101
Utility Loss
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Ga
in
(b) TFL - MRE 10%
10 3 10 2 10 1 100 101 102
Utility Loss
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Ga
in
(c) SFC - MRE
10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1
Utility Loss
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Ga
in
(d) SFC - MRE 10%
Figure 8: Privacy–Utility Trade-off: Forecasting Traffic (Aggregates Error).
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Figure 9: Privacy–Utility Trade-off: Hotspot Discovery (Prediction Accuracy & Rank Correlation).
where P is the number of concordant pairs, Q that of discor-
dant pairs, T the number of ties only in X, and U the number
of ties only in X′. If a tie occurs for the same pair in both X
and X′, it is not added to either T or U [24].
In the case of TFL, Figure 9a shows that DGFR and SMP
have small utility loss (0.1–0.15) and relatively high privacy
gain (0.5–0.8), indicating that they are indeed suitable for
hotspot discovery tasks. However, if the ranking of the top
stations is crucial, then, defense strategies such as SSC or PSC
outperform the others (Figure 9b). In SFC, for hotspot pre-
diction, FPA and SFPA perform best as they yield higher PG
for similar levels of utility. The same observation holds for
ranking the top locations (Figure 9d), even though SSC could
be used if one is willing to sacrifice some privacy for slightly
better utility (0.4 PG and 0.75 utility loss).
5.3 Map Inference: Distribution Similarity
Tasks like map inference – i.e., inferring road maps from
GPS traces [27] or labeling locations [53] – rely on the fact that
certain locations are more frequently visited than others [3].
Thus, to evaluate utility in this setting, we use the Jensen-
Shannon (JS) divergence, which estimates the similarity be-
tween two probability distributions. This captures whether
the distribution of location visits is preserved (for each times-
lot) after applying a defense. JS is a smoothed version of
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) that is symmetric and always de-
fined. Given two probability distributions, V and W, the JS-
divergence is calculated as:
JS(V||W) = 1
2
·KL(V||Z) + 1
2
·KL(W||Z) (5)
where Z = 12 · (V +W). JS is a value between 0 and 1 with
larger values indicating bigger distance between the distribu-
tions (i.e., worse utility for map inference).
Figure 10 visualizes the privacy–utility trade-off of the var-
ious defenses for map inference tasks, for both datasets. For
TFL, Figure 10a shows that a few defenses, including sampling
without or with FPA (SMP or SFPA), DGAR, PSC, and SPSC
do achieve good trade-offs. For instance, sampling yields a
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Figure 10: Privacy–Utility Trade-off: Map Inference (Distribu-
tion Similarity).
0.06 utility loss for a mean privacy gain of 0.8, while, when
combined with small count perturbation, PG reaches 0.96 for
a utility loss of 0.11. For SFC, DGAR as well as SFPA yield
privacy gains between 0.25 and 0.75 with approx. 0.1 utility
loss (Figure 10b). Higher privacy levels achieved by FPA or
DGFR only come with increase in utility loss, while other de-
fenses such as sampling with small count perturbation or small
count suppression (SPSC or SSC) yield worse utility without
actually improving privacy.
5.4 Anomaly Detection: Correlation
Finally, analytics aiming to detect mobility anomalies [33]
and/or improve traffic forecasting in the presence of an
anomaly, require that a linear relationship between two
time-series—before and after applying a defense—is pre-
served [35]. Thus, here we calculate the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient between the perturbed and raw aggregate time-
series to measure utility. The Pearson correlation varies be-
tween −1 and +1, with values closer to 1 indicating positive
linear correlation, and to −1 total negative correlation (values
close to 0 imply no linear correlation). Given two signals Y
and Y′, the Pearson correlation is computed as:
r(Y,Y′) = ∑(Y− µY) · (Y
′ − µY′ )√
(Y− µY)2 · (Y′ − µY′ )2
(6)
where µX is the mean of a signal X.
In the TFL setting, data generalization with adaptive ranges
(DGAR) and sampling (SMP) offer a reasonable balance in
the trade-off (Figure 11a), while other defenses, such as FPA,
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Figure 11: Privacy–Utility Trade-off: Anomaly Detection (Corre-
lation).
data generalization with fixed ranges (DGFR), and small count
suppression (SSC), increase privacy only if breaking the corre-
lations. For SFC (Figure 11b), FPA with or without sampling
yields, resp., 0.75 PG with 0.6 utility loss and 0.92 PG with
0.7 utility loss. In this case, DGAR achieves smaller utility
loss (0.18) with some decrease in privacy gain (0.25).
5.5 Take Aways
The analysis presented in this section shows that defenses
yield variable trade-offs for different analytics. There are de-
fenses, such as spatio-temporal generalization, that not only
yield poor utility, but also do not protect privacy. Other de-
fenses, e.g., suppressing locations/timeslots based on their
popularity, generally yield good utility for the analytics un-
der consideration, but they provide poor levels of privacy. De-
fenses like data generalization, small count suppression, sam-
pling, perturbation, or combinations of the last two, can be
configured to obtain reasonable privacy levels while still pro-
viding utility for certain applications. In particular, data gen-
eralization techniques enable analysts to perform forecasting
traffic tasks, hotspot discovery, and map inference, while small
count suppression can be useful towards ranking hotspots.
Sampling can retain utility for tasks such as location labeling
and anomaly detection, but, from a privacy perspective, they
work better when the dataset is sparse.
Perturbation techniques configured to guarantee strong DP
achieve reasonable accuracy for applications such as discov-
ering hotspots and forecasting their traffic, while additional
tasks, e.g., forecasting the traffic of less busy ROIs or detect-
ing anomalies, are more efficient when the injected noise is tai-
lored to achieve weaker privacy notions (e.g., crowd-blending
privacy). Interestingly, our results show that combining de-
fenses, e.g., sampling and perturbation, not only helps privacy,
but also retains utility for tasks such as ranking hotspots, map
inference, and anomaly detection.
In conclusion, our evaluation highlights that there is no sil-
ver bullet against MIAs on aggregate location time-series and
the design of a generalizable and robust defense is very chal-
lenging. However, for specific tasks and datasets, it is possible
to select and configure defenses that provide acceptable utility
to analysts without being detrimental to privacy—our exten-
sive evaluations show why and how.
6 Related Work
Location Privacy. Golle and Partridge [13] demonstrate the
feasibility of re-identifying users by leveraging the unique-
ness of their home/work places. Shokri et al. [44] show that
k-anonymity in the context of location traces is mostly inef-
fective, while Zang and Bolot [54] that anonymization of lo-
cation data is, in general, extremely difficult. De Montjoye et
al. [9] measure the uniqueness of human mobility in a Call De-
tail Records (CDR) dataset, finding that four spatio-temporal
points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals.
They also show that coarsening the data, both spatially and
temporally, does not add significant anonymity.
We have also discussed and experimented with defense tech-
niques based on generalization [14, 6, 49] and hiding [19, 43];
although some of these efforts also focus on understanding
which characteristics of location data threaten user privacy,
they do so for single users’ location traces—a different setting
than aggregate location time-series.
Aggregate location privacy. Aggregation is often not an ef-
fective way to preserve the privacy of location data, as aggre-
gates leak information about individual users. Xu et al. [52]
reconstruct victims’ location trajectories from aggregate mo-
bility data, without any prior knowledge, while [36] shows that
aggregate location time-series can be used by an adversary to
build accurate profiles of users’ movements. Finally, Bouko-
ros et al. [4] study the effect of defenses on finding points of
interest while computing aggregated statistics of geo-located
measurements; in this work, we focus on a different privacy
violation, i.e., membership inference.
Membership inference on aggregate locations. As discussed
in Section 2.2, Pyrgelis et al. [37] model MIAs against ag-
gregate locations using a distinguishability game, and train a
classifier to differentiate aggregates including the data of a tar-
get from those that do not. While our analysis is based on
their attacks, our research objective is substantially different.
Pyrgelis et al.’s main goal is to investigate the feasibility of
inference attacks; whereas, we aim to gain a deeper under-
standing about the reasons behind the attacks’ success, pro-
viding insights about locations and times that ease inference
and the characteristics of the users that are affected more than
others. Moreover, [37] only studies the utility-privacy trade-
off provided by differential privacy [39, 10], while we use the
insights obtained in our analysis to select potential mitigation
approaches, which we evaluate, both in terms of privacy and
utility, in the context of various spatio-temporal analytics tasks.
MIAs in other settings. In [20], Homer et al. show that
aggregate genomic statistics leak information about the in-
clusion of a target’s genome in the dataset. Then, Wang et
al. [50] improve on the attack by taking into account correla-
tions within the human genome, while Backes et al. [2] gen-
eralize the attack to other types of data like microRNA ex-
pression datasets. The data targeted by these studies does not
have spatio-temporal dimensions, and thus they are orthogonal
to our work. Buscher et al. [5] study MIAs in the context of
smart-metering, showing how aggregating a small number of
household readings does not protect the privacy of individual
(house) profiles. While smart metering data is also a time-
series, it does not have spatial components, and the correla-
tions are different. Finally, previous work studies membership
inference on machine learning models, i.e., learning whether a
data point was used to train a model, using the intuition that
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the model ends up overfitting on data used for training [41].
The attack is also effective under less restrictive adversarial
assumptions [40] and feasible in broader scenarios. Hayes et
al. [16] show that MIAs are also possible against generative
models, while Melis et al. [29] do so for collaborative and fed-
erated learning. Protection mechanisms against MIA on ma-
chine learning, such as dropout or model stacking [40], or ad-
versarial training [32], cannot be applied in our scenario since
the aggregate publication does not involve learning. Thus,
studies that aim at understanding why membership on machine
learning works [47] cannot inform defenses for aggregate lo-
cation time-series.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we conducted the first in-depth study of why and
how membership inference attacks on location aggregates are
successful, aiming to inform the design of defenses that main-
tain the utility of the statistics. We found that both regular
and uncommon mobility patterns are the easiest to recognize.
Also, size matters: users contributing a lot of data to the ag-
gregates are easier to attack. However, there is no characteris-
tic that can be singled out and eliminated to thwart the attack.
Thus, it is unlikely that a unique generic defense can preserve
the utility of the analytics for arbitrary applications. Nonethe-
less, our evaluation of defenses for a range of applications and
mobility profiles shows that it is possible to design ad-hoc ef-
fective defenses that provide reasonable utility. For instance,
data generalization techniques can be used for traffic forecast-
ing and anomaly detection tasks, while hotspot discovery and
map inference can be supported via sampling or perturbation
on sparse and dense datasets, respectively.
Our study of defenses, while comprehensive, is inevitably
limited to adapting existing location privacy defenses, and to
a subset of parameters. Thus, it remains an open question
whether new ad-hoc strategies tailored to counter MIA could
provide a better privacy-utility trade-off for one application,
or even a wider range of mobility analytics. A promising op-
tion is the use of differentially private noise highly tuned for
a specific task. Another avenue to explore is the generation of
synthetic data tailored to mobility analytics that rely on aggre-
gates instead of trajectories, i.e., schemes that preserve space
and time and granularity while still providing privacy. As a
starting point for this line of research, we make the source code
of all our experiments and implementations available upon re-
quest, hoping that they will serve as a building block for tools
helping analysts and data providers to select the right defense
mechanism. In future work, we also plan to release APIs pro-
viding easy access to various defense strategies and to inves-
tigate the effectiveness of defenses against privacy violations
other than membership inference.
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A Fourier Perturbation Algorithm
The Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA) [39] operates as fol-
lows: a time-series is first transformed to the frequency domain
using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), and l Fourier co-
efficients Fl are retained (l is an algorithm parameter). Then, Fl
is perturbed with noise sampled from the Laplace distribution,
with scale O(
√
l ·∆ f2/e) and padded with zeros to the size of
the original time-series (note that ∆ f2 depicts the `2 norm of
the users’ sensitivity). Finally, the inverse DFT is performed
on Fl to obtain the perturbed time-series. As discussed in [39],
FPA provides e-DP guarantees.
B Utility Metrics for Defenses
We report tables that demonstrate how each defense affects the
various utility metrics that we consider. For ease of compar-
isons, Table 4 shows, for each of the considered metrics, the
utility corresponding to a random guess.
Dataset MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
TFL 4285.809 13.267 0.099 0.002 0.733 -0.002
SFC 85.122 0.08 0.094 -0.001 0.472 0.001
Table 4: Utility metrics corresponding to a random guess.
Group Size MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
5 26.326 0.113 0.485 0.098 0.596 0.581
10 61.457 0.234 0.383 0.102 0.662 0.525
20 145.056 0.449 0.259 0.043 0.702 0.489
Table 5: TFL, Utility for Spatial Generalization (SPG).
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Grid Size MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
5x5 0.840 0.019 0.534 0.036 0.215 0.684
2x2 71.270 0.055 0.344 0.016 0.402 0.507
1x1 114.199 0.086 0.049 0.017 0.434 0.367
Table 6: SFC, Utility for Spatial Generalization (SPG).
Timeslot MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
4 Hours 0.146 0.152 0.776 0.076 0.272 0.596
8 Hours 0.308 0.308 0.753 0.049 0.426 0.474
1 Day 0.777 0.741 0.738 0.020 0.605 0.225
1 Week 2.945 2.221 0.651 0.003 0.658 0.000
Table 7: TFL, Utility for Temporal Generalization (TG).
Timeslot MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
4 Hours 0.134 0.066 0.823 0.056 0.139 0.632
8 Hours 0.280 0.104 0.781 0.074 0.186 0.413
1 Day 0.703 0.135 0.709 0.040 0.246 0.086
1 Week 2.493 0.149 0.455 -0.057 0.324 0.000
Table 8: SFC, Utility for Temporal Generalization (TG).
x MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 0.884 0.002 0.955 0.353 0.108 0.640
5 1.779 0.004 0.916 0.224 0.153 0.393
10 4.472 0.008 0.853 0.182 0.238 0.278
50 22.516 0.037 0.431 0.150 0.453 0.040
150 67.673 0.153 0.399 0.151 0.578 0.003
9500 4281.495 13.261 0.400 0.151 0.724 0.000
Table 9: TFL, Utility for Data Generalization with fixed ranges of
size x (DGFR).
x MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 0.659 0.000 0.983 0.802 0.070 0.809
5 1.358 0.001 0.953 0.525 0.103 0.700
10 3.385 0.002 0.911 0.316 0.164 0.594
50 17.012 0.011 0.658 0.084 0.354 0.239
100 34.214 0.020 0.218 0.031 0.416 0.059
250 84.667 0.054 0.103 0.017 0.432 0.000
Table 10: SFC, Utility for Data Generalization with fixed ranges
of size x (DGFR).
x′ MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
1 0.136 0.041 0.711 0.043 0.175 0.439
2 0.022 0.025 0.715 0.045 0.117 0.810
4 0.005 0.012 0.785 0.060 0.068 0.889
8 0.002 0.006 0.820 0.095 0.039 0.901
16 0.000 0.002 0.850 0.159 0.020 0.903
Table 11: TFL, Utility for Data Generalization with adaptive
ranges and x′ buckets (DGAR).
x′ MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
1 0.045 0.021 0.745 0.083 0.153 0.412
2 0.015 0.013 0.783 0.106 0.113 0.842
4 0.006 0.006 0.873 0.167 0.063 0.943
8 0.002 0.003 0.928 0.327 0.030 0.971
16 0.001 0.001 0.961 0.529 0.014 0.978
Table 12: SFC, Utility for Data Generalization with adaptive
ranges and x′ buckets (DGAR).
k MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 0.016 0.000 0.978 0.905 0.039 0.646
5 0.028 0.000 0.962 0.818 0.078 0.399
10 0.035 0.002 0.915 0.618 0.119 0.285
20 0.041 0.010 0.767 0.402 0.171 0.162
40 0.045 0.038 0.485 0.259 0.224 0.061
80 0.047 0.056 0.398 0.161 0.256 0.012
Table 13: TFL, Utility for Suppressing Small Counts (SSC).
k MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 0.007 0.000 1.000 0.998 0.034 0.815
5 0.015 0.000 0.999 0.992 0.087 0.710
10 0.021 0.000 0.995 0.964 0.150 0.610
20 0.029 0.001 0.978 0.885 0.269 0.503
40 0.041 0.005 0.869 0.769 0.468 0.324
80 0.050 0.032 0.381 0.214 0.532 0.104
160 0.053 0.059 0.103 0.015 0.595 0.005
Table 14: SFC, Utility for Suppressing Small Counts (SSC).
z MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.000 0.0 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.904
0.4 0.001 0.0 0.999 0.973 0.002 0.892
0.6 0.006 0.0 0.991 0.896 0.018 0.818
0.8 0.021 0.0 0.968 0.576 0.076 0.639
Table 15: TFL, Utility for Suppressing Less Popular Loca-
tions/Timeslots (SLP).
z MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.001 0.0 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.968
0.4 0.006 0.0 0.999 0.987 0.039 0.891
0.6 0.016 0.0 0.989 0.905 0.149 0.717
0.8 0.031 0.0 0.951 0.797 0.336 0.523
Table 16: SFC, Utility for Suppressing Less Popular Loca-
tions/Timeslots (SLP).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.010 0.012 0.939 0.222 0.029 0.838
0.4 0.019 0.024 0.905 0.190 0.047 0.759
0.6 0.029 0.036 0.863 0.173 0.068 0.656
0.8 0.038 0.048 0.792 0.160 0.105 0.503
Table 17: TFL, Utility for Sampling (SMP).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.011 0.012 0.931 0.329 0.040 0.922
0.4 0.021 0.024 0.894 0.208 0.066 0.849
0.6 0.032 0.036 0.846 0.145 0.099 0.751
0.8 0.042 0.048 0.761 0.099 0.160 0.594
Table 18: SFC, Utility for Sampling (SMP).
k MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 0.434 0.000 0.829 0.646 0.080 0.570
5 0.439 0.000 0.824 0.584 0.084 0.553
10 0.440 0.001 0.815 0.449 0.085 0.548
20 0.440 0.001 0.801 0.309 0.086 0.546
40 0.439 0.002 0.795 0.201 0.086 0.546
80 0.439 0.002 0.795 0.159 0.086 0.546
Table 19: TFL, Utility for Perturbing Small Counts with e′=1.0
(PSC).
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k MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
2 3.397 0.000 0.961 0.810 0.163 0.610
5 3.411 0.000 0.949 0.780 0.185 0.567
10 3.427 0.000 0.930 0.749 0.204 0.534
20 3.478 0.000 0.897 0.696 0.228 0.474
40 3.448 0.002 0.840 0.546 0.249 0.417
80 3.417 0.006 0.754 0.217 0.255 0.395
160 3.429 0.009 0.746 0.116 0.255 0.393
Table 20: SFC, Utility for Perturbing Small Counts with e′=0.1
(PSC).
e MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.01 112.526 0.381 0.124 0.034 0.666 0.005
0.1 11.310 0.058 0.251 0.032 0.412 0.043
1.0 1.149 0.022 0.721 0.043 0.175 0.236
10.0 0.087 0.020 0.758 0.053 0.116 0.447
Table 21: TFL, Utility for Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA).
e MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.01 74.957 0.106 0.136 0.047 0.577 0.001
0.1 22.855 0.052 0.220 0.008 0.523 0.034
1.0 2.387 0.013 0.784 0.093 0.218 0.263
10.0 0.234 0.011 0.841 0.137 0.107 0.540
Table 22: SFC, Utility for Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.444 0.012 0.777 0.091 0.099 0.505
0.4 0.449 0.024 0.741 0.066 0.119 0.448
0.6 0.454 0.036 0.688 0.054 0.150 0.374
0.8 0.460 0.048 0.570 0.042 0.214 0.261
Table 23: TFL, Utility for Sampling & Perturbing Small Counts
with k=5 and e′=1.0 (SPSC).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 3.348 0.012 0.812 0.248 0.263 0.410
0.4 3.394 0.024 0.698 0.122 0.311 0.333
0.6 3.388 0.036 0.504 0.037 0.379 0.237
0.8 3.459 0.047 0.279 -0.011 0.481 0.115
Table 24: SFC, Utility for Sampling & Perturbing Small Counts
with k=20 and e′=0.1 (SPSC).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.033 0.025 0.757 0.052 0.113 0.452
0.4 0.036 0.033 0.754 0.051 0.115 0.419
0.6 0.040 0.041 0.750 0.051 0.118 0.372
0.8 0.044 0.050 0.736 0.046 0.129 0.290
Table 25: TFL, Utility for Sampling & Fourier Perturbation Al-
gorithm with e=10.0 (SFPA).
w MRE MRE 10% F1 τ JS r
0.2 0.214 0.016 0.839 0.137 0.109 0.526
0.4 0.192 0.025 0.838 0.135 0.112 0.506
0.6 0.159 0.036 0.834 0.129 0.119 0.477
0.8 0.109 0.048 0.824 0.111 0.134 0.413
Table 26: SFC, Utility for Sampling & Fourier Perturbation Al-
gorithm with e=10.0 (SFPA).
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